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Preface
In this new brief, Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith addresses
the nature of the financial crisis in the United States, and, in par-
ticular, its relationship to the role played over the last generation
by the economics profession. 
The global abatement of the inflationary climate of the past
three decades, combined with continuing financial instability
(e.g., the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s), helped to
promote the worldwide holding of U.S. dollar reserves as a cush-
ion against financial instability outside the United States, with the
result that, for the United States itself, this was a period of remark-
able price stability and reasonably stable economic expansion. 
For the most part, the economics profession viewed these
events as a story of central bank credibility, fiscal probity, 
and accelerating technological change coupled with changing
demands on the labor market, creating a mental model of
self-stabilizing free markets and hands-off policy makers moti-
vated by doing the right thing—what Galbraith calls “the grand
illusion of the Great Moderation.” A dissenting line of criticism
focused on the stagnation of real wages, the growth of deficits in
trade and the current account, and the search for new markets,
with its associated costs. This view implied that a crisis would
occur, as the situation was intrinsically unstable, but that it would
result from a rejection of U.S. financial hegemony and a crash of
the dollar, with the euro and the European Union (EU) the
ostensible beneficiaries. 
A third line of argument went beyond these two broadly
opposing and symmetric views, a line articulated by two figures
with substantially different perspectives on the Keynesian tradi-
tion: Wynne Godley and Hyman P. Minsky. Galbraith discusses
the approaches of these Levy distinguished scholars, including
Godley’s correlation of government surpluses and private debt
accumulation and Minsky’s financial stability hypothesis, as well
as their influence on the responses of the larger economic 
community. 
Galbraith himself argues the fundamental illusion of viewing
the U.S. economy through the free-market prism of deregulation,
privatization, and a benevolent government operating mainly
through monetary stabilization. The real sources of American
economic power, he says, lie with those who manage and control
the public-private sectors—especially the public institutions in
those sectors—and who often have a political agenda in hand.
Galbraith calls this the predator state: a state that is not intent
upon restructuring the rules in any idealistic way but upon using
the existing institutions as a device for political patronage on a
grand scale. And it is closely aligned with deregulation.
In the last decade, as clear signals were sent that previous
laws, regulations, and supervisory standards would be relaxed, the
financial industry was overrun by the most aggressive practition-
ers of the art of originating and distributing mortgages that were
plainly fraudulent. The rewards of involvement were extraordi-
nary, to the point that 40 percent of reported profits in the United
States were earned in the banking sector by enterprises that paid
out about half of their gross revenues in compensation.
The game came to an end, of course, in September 2008,
with the failure of Lehman Brothers. The Troubled Asset Relief
Program effectively quelled a panic, but at the price of fore-
stalling restructuring and reform that would get at the root of
the financial crisis. And even though we have managed to side-
step a second Great Depression, that success is marked by
extreme limitations: by a decimated housing sector and a reeling
middle class; by the functional dismantling of the major institu-
tions of the American welfare state; and by a loss of trust in the
financial sector that cannot be regained until those responsible
for the mortgage fraud are identified and prosecuted, in full.
And there is the issue of Europe. The events in Europe are
customarily treated as a Greek crisis, but this is a profoundly mis-
leading narrative, and it misses the essential part of the story. In
September–October 2008, as the U.S. financial crisis was peaking,
the spreads on Greek government bonds began to diverge from
those on German government bonds, and they have been diverg-
ing ever since. Clearly, this is related not to Greek profligacy but
to the crisis in the United States and a generalized flight to safety.Public Policy Brief, No. 112 4
Still to be resolved is the political game between the bond 
markets and the EU and European Central Bank over whether
the latter entities will relieve the large financial institutions of
their losses. In Galbraith’s view, the only way this game can be
resolved is with the capitulation of the authorities and the
Europeanization of Mediterranean debts. This leaves Europe
with a situation very similar to what we have in the United States,
in which the banks have been effectively rescued but the
economies have not, and the price is paid by relentless rounds of
fiscal austerity—with the possibility that the economies on both
continents may be unable to move back to a pattern of con-
structive growth. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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This brief is adapted from an address to the German Association
for American Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin; May 27, 2010.
I want to address the nature of the financial crisis in the United
States, and, in particular, its relationship to the role played over
the last generation by the economics profession. The first theme
of my remarks I’ve given a little subtitle to, “The Grand Illusion
of the Great Moderation”—a characterization of the last three
decades in economic life that gained a great deal of prominence,
partly because it was championed over the years by Ben
Bernanke, the now-incumbent chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were an extraordinarily tur-
bulent time. They were a time of sharply declining competitive-
ness in manufacturing and trade union power, followed later in
the 1980s by the collapse of the Soviet Union and associated gov-
ernments, the opening of world commodity markets to a very
significant degree, and the rise of labor-intensive goods produced
in China and their penetration in world markets. Consequently,
there was a global subsidence of the inflation that had built up in
the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and into the early 1980s. At
the same time, continuing financial instability, including the
crises in Asia in 1997 and in Russia in 1998, helped to promote
the worldwide holding of U.S. dollar reserves as a cushion against
financial instability outside the United States—with the result
that, for the United States itself, this was a period of remarkable
price stability and reasonably stable economic expansion. 
The economics profession did not give these events the cos-
mopolitan interpretation that I just have. Rather, it reduced them
to a story of the credibility of the central banks (specifically, the
Federal Reserve), of probity and responsibility on the part of the
fiscal authorities, of accelerating technological change coupled
with the changing demands on the labor market—all of which
were, if you like, characterizations of causal relationships that
very well could have happened in any closed economy. Thus, the
economists created a mental model of self-stabilizing free mar-
kets and hands-off policy makers motivated to do the right thing,
full of good intentions and primarily dedicated to maintaining an
overarching climate of price level stability so as to permit the
forces of the free market to reach their maximum efficiency. 
Arguments between economists largely resolved into a
debate between the purists, who held that essentially no govern-
ment intervention in the economy was required; and those who
professed a slightly more pragmatic bent, and who argued that,
from time to time, it might also be useful to have a stabilizing
contribution from the fiscal authorities to offset external shocks
and other forces that might, from time to time, cause a distur-
bance in labor markets. This view came to be a very widely held
one in the economics profession right up into 2008, when the
American Economic Association was sponsoring sessions with
such broad and confident titles as “How Did the World Come to
a Consensus on Monetary Policy?” 
I find a little irony in this, because one of the ostensible 
great contributors to the climate of the Great Moderation 
was the change in Federal Reserve reporting procedures insti-
tuted in the mid-1970s under what came to be known as the
Humphrey-Hawkins process, whereby the chairman of the Board
of Governors reports every six months to both houses of
Congress as to the goals and objectives of the Federal Reserve.
The irony for me is that I happen to have been the young 
staff member on the banking committee of the House of
Representatives who drafted the statutory language that went into
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, requiring that testimony. And for
seven or eight years I was the staff person who actually organ-
ized the hearings, who wrote the questions and otherwise tried to
antagonize the Federal Reserve to the extent that I could.
Certainly, as a young man in his middle twenties, I did not think
that I was contributing in any serious way to a revolutionary
development in the stabilization of the global economy. But there
were economists 30 years later who, if they could have known of
my role, would have been obliged to give me some credit for it. 
This is not to say that everybody in advance of the crisis
accepted this worldview. There was a line of criticism that for the
purposes of this brief I will call the Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg cri-
tique. This is a view that pointed to the dark side of the Great
Moderation, a view that focused on the alleged—and indeed,
reported—stagnation of the real wage in the United States, par-
ticularly in relationship to productivity growth, and the implied
deterioration of the distribution of income, of wages in favor of
profits. It emphasized the highly measured and much remarked-
upon increase in economic inequality. It also drew attention to
the consequences of the deindustrialization of the 1980s, in par-
ticular the large and ever growing deficit in trade and the cur-
rent account, and, ultimately, to what Rosa Luxemburg would
have described as a “crisis in realization,” otherwise known as the
problem of imperial overstretch, of the search for markets and
the cost of that search, vividly brought to the world’s attention in
2003 at the time of the American invasion of Iraq. Public Policy Brief, No. 112 6
This story formed the basis of a leftist critique in and outside
of the United States. It implied that there would be a crisis, as the
situation was intrinsically unstable, but that the crisis would
come first and foremost from a rejection of U.S. financial hege-
mony as a whole, and of the instruments of that hegemony;
namely, the assets denominated in dollars held around the world.
It would come, in other words, from a crash of the dollar; osten-
sibly, the beneficiaries of that crisis would be the euro and the
European Union. Europe, in this view, was considered a con-
trasting sociopolitical entity with largely solid social democratic
virtues, a relatively low military burden—in fact, a turning away
from militarism—and a relatively balanced set of international
accounts. So I think we did see a number of scholars who had
misgivings about—or indeed, a radical dissent from—the nar-
rative of the Great Moderation. 
But both of these views, the GM view and the MLL (or
Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg) view, showcase what is essentially a
real-economy analysis. It is an analysis rooted in deep phenom-
ena—in a flexible labor market, for example, which could either
be celebrated for its ability to deliver employment or castigated
for its inability to sustain real wages; in an efficient capital mar-
ket, which could be celebrated for bringing world production to
its highest achievable level or castigated for its effects on
American labor—and a process of class struggle and the search
for the realization of surplus (in the MLL view). Neither the GM
nor the MLL perspective focused intently on the financial sector,
on the monetary aspects of the production process or the rela-
tionship of credit to output. Nor did either focus on the rela-
tionship between the public and private sectors in the United
States. Neither, therefore, came very close to developing a truly
useful and relevant analysis of what actually occurred. 
A third line of argument went beyond these two broadly
opposing and symmetric views, a line I see as descending from
the ideas of John Maynard Keynes but in modern times largely
articulated by two figures with substantially different perspec-
tives on the Keynesian tradition. One of these was Wynne Godley,
a former senior adviser to the treasury in the UK, a professor of
applied economics at the University of Cambridge, and a great
gentleman who just recently passed away, in May. The other was
Hyman Minsky, a maverick financial economist to whom I shall
return momentarily. Godley articulated his approach in a series
of papers published by the Levy Institute beginning in the mid-
1990s. He argued above all that it was essential to develop a
macroeconomics in which the accounting relationships were
consistently articulated, so that their implications could not be
ignored and the consequences of things happening in any one
part of the economy would be fully taken into account in the
analysis. One of the things that Godley’s analysis pointed to, very
effectively, over this period was the unsustainability of surpluses
in the government’s budget. It is odd now to reflect on that, but
in the late 1990s the U.S. government budget went into a very
substantial surplus, and at the end of that decade Larry Summers,
then secretary of the treasury, happily made the projection, at a
meeting I attended and on other occasions, that if things con-
tinued, the United States’ public debt would be totally eliminated
in the space of 13 years or so. 
The essence of the Godley analysis was that it was pointless
to make such projections, as things could not continue: the law
once articulated by Herbert Stein, chair of the Council of
Economic Advisors under Richard Nixon, would apply. Stein’s
Law famously states that when a trend cannot continue, it will
stop. Why so? Because the accounting obverse of a surplus in the
public sector is a deficit in the private sector, a deficit manifested
in the increasing accumulation of debts held by, in the late 1990s,
mainly private corporations, and mainly in the technology sec-
tor. That is to say, there was an obligation to make good by gen-
erating cash flows on financial commitments via increasingly
improbable business plans—an obligation that, in fact, could not
be honored and was not honored, and that was largely repudiated
in the slump that followed the crash in the tech sector in the mid-
dle of 2000. And, of course, government budgets went promptly
back into deficit at that time.
A second proposition of the Godley analysis related to the
events that then developed in the housing sector over the course
of the decade of the 2000s. Now a different part of the private
sector went increasingly into debt. Households increasingly took
on mortgage obligations, draining the equity from their homes
in order to support their consumption patterns, generating con-
struction and other forms of economic activity. In so doing, they
generated tax revenues, which again narrowed (though they did
not eliminate) the government budget deficit over this period,
while sustaining economic growth until around 2008.The essen-
tial point was that this phenomenon, like the previous one, had
definite limits, because private parties, unlike governments, do
have to repay their debts. 
Hyman Minsky’s analysis, although thoroughly compatible
with Godley’s, focused on the intrinsic instability of the finan-
cial sector, an instability from which the Great Moderation Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
economists assiduously avert their eyes because it violates their
notions of human economic rationality, but an instability that is
nevertheless, in Minsky’s view, entirely the product of rational
processes. Minsky’s argument was that stability itself creates
instability. A period of stable economic growth and low inflation
generates increasing confidence on the part of economic players.
They can come to believe that they are part of a new era—that
things really have changed. They come to be discontented with
the low rates of return that are available on ordinary investments
and therefore naturally seek the frontiers of greater risk. As they
do that, they are seeking more and more to be on the tails of the
distribution—to move the mean of the distribution (something
that is quite difficult to achieve)—and they shift from a position
in which their financial obligations are what Minsky called hedge
positions—completely fundable on the basis of historic cash
flows—to speculative positions, which must be refinanced in
uncertain conditions at some future time. These conditions may
well be favorable to refinancing; they may well be sustainable for
at least some time. But they are not guaranteed to be such,
depending as they do upon basically unforeseeable macroeco-
nomic circumstances at the time the debts come due. 
The problem is that as more and more players move into
speculative territory, they reach a second-phase boundary,
another transition, moving from what Minsky called speculative
finance to what he called Ponzi finance, or a situation in which
financial commitments can be met only with further borrow-
ings—a situation that is intrinsically unsustainable for a private
party because no one will lend to someone who must borrow in
order to pay interest on previous debts. 
There were some who did see unsustainable processes at
work. Dean Baker, head of the Center for Economic Policy
Research in Washington, D.C., was a remarkable example.
Beginning in the early part of the last decade he called attention
to, among other things, the sign of extraordinarily high price-
rental ratios in the public housing sector—high and rising, and
clearly more likely to fall at some time than to continue to rise
forever. A great deal of credit has to go to those few people work-
ing in the Godley and Minsky traditions who were brave enough
to foresee the developments that had in fact occurred and whose
framework was such that it put them quite close to the actual
character of the disaster that unfolded from 2007 forward. 
Yet I don’t think either of these analyses gets quite to the
heart of the issues. So I would like to put before you a third line,
one that is broadly in descent from my father’s work, in The New
Industrial State, on the role of the great corporation and its 
relationship to financial authority. This is a theme that I took up
in general terms in application to the situation that we now face,
in my 2008 book The Predator State. The argument I made was
that it is fundamentally an illusion—an error—to view the U.S.
economy through the free-market prism, created in the Reagan
period, of deregulation, privatization, and a detached, benevo-
lent government operating mainly through monetary stabiliza-
tion. I would argue instead that when you examine the
institutions of American economic growth you find a dominant
role in many important areas of the public sector—of the gov-
ernment—usually in a kind of partnership with private institu-
tions. This is found, for example, in the Social Security system,
which provides a bulwark against poverty for the elderly but is
supplemented by many of them through private pensions and
investments accumulated over the years in tax-sheltered private
accounts. It’s true of the health care system, which is a public sys-
tem for very substantial parts of the population: everyone age 65
and over is covered by Medicare, a great many poor people are
covered by Medicaid, veterans are assisted by the Veterans
Benefits Administration, and public employees are, of course,
covered. 
But the public sector in health care operates in a kind of
antagonistic partnership, and a very difficult and inefficient part-
nership, with a private sector that continues to provide private
health insurance largely through employers with, again, tax-
favored programs. This is also true of higher education, in which
public and private institutions hold approximately equal weight.
A system of land-grant universities has produced some of the
greatest achievements of U.S. higher education over the years,
but there are also fine private institutions that depend very heav-
ily on tax-favored philanthropic contributions. And it’s true in
the housing sector: in the financing of privately owned homes, in
the institutions, created in the New Deal and reinforced in the
Great Society, that gave us 30-year fixed-rate mortgages; that gave
us Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (public entities that were later
privatized), which refinanced those mortgages; that created a
structure in the 1930s through the ’70s and ’80s of savings-and-
loan institutions that were dedicated to housing finance and that
operated under special interest-rate regulations that permitted
them certain advantages in the financial marketplace.
By and large, these public-private collaborations, while inef-
ficient and defective in important respects—again, that’s cer-
tainly true of our health care—have been substantial successes.Public Policy Brief, No. 112 8
They are very robust politically and they achieve their stated
objective, by and large, by facilitating wide access to the services
that they foster. In comparison with this system, particularly
when one also considers the regulation of many other aspects of
the economy, truly free markets are very small change. They
barely exist; they are a fringe phenomenon. And while they hold
a particular pride of place in American political rhetoric, practi-
cal people in political life understand their limited nature. That
is to say, conservatives, particularly in recent administrations,
have understood very well that the true sources of American
power lie with those who manage and control the public-private
sectors, especially the public institutions in those sectors. 
The conservative objective in modern times has not been to
privatize these institutions completely or to eliminate them but
to place them in sympathetic hands, and thus to permit small
amounts of vast cash flows to be directed to politically favored
groups. This is what I call the predator state: a state that is not
intent upon restructuring the rules in any idealistic way but upon
using the existing institutions as a device for political patronage
on a grand scale. Closely related to the predator state has been
the general reinterpretation (something that has troubled me
ever since I first encountered it in graduate school in the 1970s)
of the role of regulation in an economy, a reinterpretation of reg-
ulation not as a function of necessity but as a burden, as some-
thing that should be minimized to the extent possible, and where
the benefits should always be weighed against the costs. That view
is sufficiently familiar as to go unquestioned by a great many, but
I would suggest that it is a view that profoundly misconstrues
what regulation is and what it does in an advanced society.
In an advanced society, in sectors where there is the slight-
est complexity (and there are many of them), where there are
production processes involving lengthy supply chains, regulation
serves not as a burden on businesses but as a guarantee that the
markets are viable, a guarantee that it’s reasonably safe to partic-
ipate in the commerce at hand—safe to eat the lettuce or to buy
the electric appliance or to commit your savings to a financial
institution. Without the regulatory apparatus that pervades our
lives, most of the institutions in an advanced economic society,
from airlines to banks, would not exist. Nobody would get on an
airplane if they did not believe that the Federal Aviation
Administration was running traffic control—that planes were
not going to run into each other in the sky. And nobody would
put their money into banks if they did not believe that the regu-
latory agencies would have some authority over management of
their deposits and provide insurance to protect them in the case
of a run.
What happened in the last decade or so, it seems to me, is
that the predator state took root in an especially dramatic way in
the financial sector. Very clear signals were sent that previous
laws, regulations, and supervisory standards would be relaxed.
This was not a subtle business. In the first term of the second
Bush presidency, the chief of the Office of Thrift Supervision
came to a press conference with a stack of federal regulations per-
taining to underwriting standards and a chainsaw—a chainsaw.
This, as I say, was not subtle. His more subtle colleagues brought
pruning shears. The message was unambiguous: the cop was off
the beat. 
The result was that the financial industry was largely over-
run by the most aggressive practitioners of the art of originating
questionable mortgages. I’ll go further than that: the art of orig-
inating mortgages that were plainly fraudulent. It was an envi-
ronment in which the lenders certainly knew that the borrowers
would not be in a position to continue to service those mortgages
past, at most, three or four years—mortgages that were in fact
designed to have that result. These were mortgages made to peo-
ple who could not document their incomes, who had bad or non-
existent credit histories, against houses appraised by appraisers
chosen by their willingness to inflate the value of those houses
and drafted in such a way that the initial rate was low enough to
be serviced for a short period of time —so-called “teaser” rates—
but with provisions that would cause the payments to double or
triple in two or three years, when the rates were reset to what was
widely and accurately expected to be the prevailing higher inter-
est rates imposed by the Federal Reserve.
To take up just one aspect of this: there is no nonfraudulent
reason for a lender to knowingly accept an inflated appraisal on
a house. No known explanation of that can be construed as inno-
cent. Why did they do it? The business model was no longer one
of originating mortgages, holding them, and earning income as
home owners paid off their debts; it was one of originating the
mortgage, taking a fee, selling the mortgage to another entity,
and taking another fee. To do that, the mortgages had to be pack-
aged. They had to be sprinkled with the holy water of quantita-
tive risk-management models. They had to be presented to
ratings agencies and blessed and sanctified, at least in part, as
triple-A, so that they could legally be acquired by pension funds
and other fiduciaries, which have no obligation to do any due
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Alchemy was the result: a great deal of lead was marketed as
gold. I think it’s fair to say that if this sounds to you like a crim-
inal enterprise, that’s because that’s exactly what it was. There
was even a criminal language associated with it: liars’ loans,
NINJA loans(no income, no job or assets)—it sounds funny, but
in fact this is why the world financial system has melted down—
neutron loans (loans that would explode, killing the people but
leaving the buildings intact), toxic waste (that part of the securi-
tized collateral debt obligation that would take the first loss).
These are terms that are put together by people who know what
they are doing, and anybody close to the industry was familiar
with those terms. 
Again, there’s no innocent explanation. I would argue that
what happened here was an initial act of theft by the originators
of the mortgages; an act exactly equivalent to money laundering
by the ratings agencies, which passed the bad securities through
their process and relabeled them as good securities, literally leav-
ing the documentation in the hands of the originators (the com-
puter files and underlying documents were examined by the
ratings agencies only very, very sporadically); and a fencing oper-
ation, or the passing of stolen goods, by the large banks and
investment banks, which marketed them to the likes of IKB
Deutsche Industriebank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and, of
course, pension funds and other investors across the world. The
reward for being part of this was the extraordinary compensa-
tion of the banking sector, which permitted them extraordinary
results, to the point that 40 percent of reported profits in the
United States were earned in the banking sector by enterprises
that paid out about half of their gross revenues in compensa-
tion—very, very good work if you can get it.
This is not an isolated occurrence. It is something that is part
of a well-established historical pattern. That pattern has its iden-
tifiable characteristics, and those characteristics are known in the
economics literature. They were laid out very carefully in 1993
by George Akerlof and Paul Romer in an article titled “Looting:
The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” That arti-
cle was based upon the experiences of a decade previously in the
savings-and-loan industry and the work of a criminologist by
the name of William K. Black, who identified the patterns and
whose work led not only to the early recognition that the S&L
industry was being taken over by criminal enterprises but also to
later prosecutions that put about one thousand S&L insiders into
federal prison in the early-to-mid 1990s, along with roughly three
thousand others, including many commercial bankers. 
The banking sector realized that the game was up in August
2007. Everybody realized that many of their own assets were
worth nothing, and therefore they could not lend to each other
without incurring the risk that they were lending to an insolvent
party. And so the interbank loan market collapsed. The govern-
ment’s response to that has been called the Paulson Put, after
Henry Paulson, who was secretary of the Treasury at the time;
this was an effort to defer realization of the losses, if possible, past
the November 2008 elections. Thomas Ferguson and Robert
Johnson, in the International Journal of Political Economy, lay this
out in two very long articles.1They show that Paulson looked for
ways to refinance the toxic assets and he found them, in the fed-
eral housing agency, and he found them particularly by per-
suading the great secondary mortgage market makers Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their holdings of toxic securi-
ties—subprime loans—attempting, as I said, to keep the game
going a little bit longer. He did not succeed in keeping it going
past the election, of course: it came to a great crash in September
2008, with the failure of Lehman Brothers. The result of that was
an extraordinary effort to persuade Congress to pass the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in early October 2008,
effectively forcing the Democratic leadership to validate a mas-
sive rescue effort of the financial institutions that had been under
way for a year in the Republican administration.
The overall rescue effort was effective and largely success-
ful—at least in some ways. It quelled a panic that might well have
produced truly catastrophic results, but it achieved this success at
the price of a larger failure: by forestalling a restructuring and
reform that would get at the root of the financial crisis. It’s also
fair to say that the machinations at that particular moment—in
particular, the extraordinary willingness of the Republican cau-
cus in the House of Representatives to take some advice that
came out of right field and vote against TARP in the first
round—had a decisive effect on the outcome of the presidential
election. 
With the arrival of the Obama administration came a sec-
ond opportunity to get banking reform right. I’m afraid to say,
that opportunity also was not taken. The Obama administration
was compelled by the same logic that the Bush administration
had been following—that is, to prevent panic and to save insti-
tutions at the expense of pursuing the effective restructuring that
would enable them to contribute to the processes of economic
recovery anytime soon. The result of that, of course, was a polit-
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saved. They were saved by a relaxation of the accounting stan-
dards that permits them to this day to continue to fail to realize
their losses—losses that will not be repaired. It permits them to
operate profitably without making loans, by borrowing from the
central bank for practically nothing and then lending back to the
government for 3 or 4 percent—again, very good work if you can
get it; I advise everyone to take out a bank charter without
delay—and to pay themselves bonuses, too.
At the same time, the great institutions that I spoke of ear-
lier—the great public-private institutions that create obligations
for the federal government along with the progressive income
tax, among other things—cooperated through a process econo-
mists know as fiscal stabilization, putting the government into
deficit far beyond any prior predictions of what was sustainable
or stable, and creating, in exact Godley fashion, a corresponding
financial surplus in the private sector. Savings went ahead of
investment, so that the savings rate has gone up just as the gov-
ernment deficit has. This is an accounting necessity, as the two are
exactly the same phenomenon simply recorded on opposite sides
of the balance sheet. That was the principal reason why we 
didn’t move into the Great Depression, Mark II. We have a very
large government sector that moved very rapidly to stabilize
activity, as a result of processes that were baked in the cake 
and did not require new legislation. There was in addition to 
that a very useful stimulus bill, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, which, while not as large as I would have liked
it to have been, certainly is contributing now to preventing the
complete meltdown of state and local governments, and to pro-
viding construction jobs in the public sector.
That’s roughly where we are at the present time. There are
some successes—as I say, things could have been worse—but the
successes are marked by four extreme limitations. The first is in
the housing sector. Remember that housing is a source of finan-
cial wealth of what was once the American middle class. That
middle class is largely lost. The equity that it built up in its homes
over many decades is severely impaired. A very large part of that
group owes more on its mortgages than it could receive were its
houses on the market, if it could sell its housing at all. Those with
very few other liquid assets are effectively financially insolvent.
This is a problem that will only be resolved over a very long time
horizon, as people give up their homes and move into rentals—
reversing, in effect, one of the greatest social projects of the 20th
century. It’s a process that is under way, but it will be a long one,
and very painful.
A second broad area where we are not succeeding is in the
institutions that provide services at the state and local levels:
higher education, public schools, libraries, parks, police and fire
departments, all of which are under intense pressure as a result
of the federal government’s failure to completely fill the enor-
mous budget gaps that have opened up, particularly in states
where the housing crisis is most intense, like California and
Florida. The result is the functional dismantling of the major
institutions of the American welfare state going on as we speak.
The University of California has long been the greatest public
university ever created. What’s going on there now—massive
budget cuts that have led to higher fees and fewer classes—is very
sad. It’s shameful. And it’s hard to imagine how it will be reversed. 
The third area is the financial sector: how does it regain trust
and build confidence? The problem with trust is that it cannot
simply be regained; it has to be earned. It has to be merited. And
once reality sets in, once information is available, once people
realize the extent of the corruption and criminalization at the
root of this problem, trust cannot be regained until the wheels of
justice turn. I gave testimony to this effect to the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs on May 4. The issue has been
raised in other Senate subcommittees as well. It’s being raised by
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission chaired by Phil
Angelides. It’s being raised by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It’s being raised at the Justice Department. It’s
being raised by a congresswoman named Marcy Kaptur (D-OH),
who has sponsored a bill to provide an extra thousand agents to
the FBI to investigate white-collar crime. That process, once
started, must be completed, or trust cannot be restored. If it is
circumscribed, then the consequences will be roughly the same
as the consequence to the airlines if we give up air traffic control:
no one will use the institutions because the information about
their lack of safety will be out there but the corrected actions will
not have been taken. That’s the challenge we’ll have to face going
forward.
The fourth area where we have not succeeded is interna-
tional. Not enough has been made of the link between the
American crisis, which peaked in 2008, and the European crisis
peaking now. It has been customary to treat the events in Europe
as a Greek crisis, as a situation related to the particular profligacy
of the Greek government over the years—a profligacy that was
only revealed by, certainly not caused by, the present socialist gov-
ernment. I think this is s a profoundly misleading narrative, one
very similar to that blaming the crisis of U.S. states on localities,Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
and it fundamentally misses the essential story. Let’s ask at what
time the spreads on Greek government bonds began to diverge
from those on German government bonds. The answer is
September–October 2008 or just after, and those spreads have
been diverging ever since. 
Why is that? I think the answer is obviously not related to
Greece but absolutely related to New York and Washington, to
the crisis in the United States and a generalized flight to safety,
away from anything that might be considered problematic—
movement that ultimately leads to a political game between the
bond markets and the most powerful political entities available,
the European Union and the European Central Bank, over
whether those entities will relieve the large financial institutions
of the losses associated with the failure of borrowers to refinance
their debts. This game is in the process of being resolved, and I
think the only way it can be resolved is with the capitulation of
the authorities and the Europeanization of Mediterranean debts. 
This leaves Europe with something very similar to what we
have in the States, a situation in which the banks have been effec-
tively rescued but the economies have not, and the price is paid
by relentless rounds of fiscal austerity. We may get more of this
at the federal level in the United States in the months to come,
leading to an essential inability of economies on both continents
to move back to a pattern of constructive growth, with the pub-
lic and private sectors in balance, because there is nothing on the
private side that will take up the losses being incurred on the
public side. That raises a very deep question in my view: Going
forward, is it possible to construct a world in which we have
extraordinarily powerful private financial markets, equipped
with what Warren Buffett called “financial weapons of mass
destruction”—credit default swaps—greatly outbalancing the
value of the assets against which they are written and therefore
dominating the markets? Markets in which these instruments
determine the price of every bond issued by every public author-
ity except, perhaps, the Government of the United States itself? 
In that environment, how is it possible to reestablish either
long-term corporate borrowing for entrepreneurial purposes or
long-term government borrowing for capital improvements and
improving the quality of life? And if that is not possible, what
alternative institutions do we propose? 
Last summer I attended a very interesting conference in
Umbria sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences and
presided over by former President Mikhail Gorbachev. It was
small—13 to 15 people. I was the only American, and I gave my
remarks at the opening session. I said, “Mr. President, when
Homer returns to write the history of this epoch, he will no
doubt say that the Russian mathematicians streamed forth from
Muscovy in 1991 and presented themselves before the gates of
Wall Street bearingthe gift of quantitative risk management, and
they were received with joy. In 20 years they had done their work
and succeeded in destroying the whole place. It was the greatest
Trojan horse operation since Troy. So he will no doubt say, Mr.
President, that you were responsible not only for the demise of
Soviet Communism but also for the demise of financial capital-
ism.” To which Gorbachev responded, “I’ve been accused of
worse.”
We do have to ask whether Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg
may have the last laugh in this matter. If we do not wish them to
have the last laugh—and I do not; I would much rather it be John
Maynard Keynes, Wynne Godley, and Hyman Minsky who have
the last laugh—then we really must get to work and change not
only our thinking but also our actions at this stage. Because I
think that the moment when the issue will be decided is not very
far away. 
Transcribed by Amy Masarwe.
Note
1.    See Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson, “Too Big to Bail:
The ‘Paulson Put,’ Presidential Politics, and the Global
Financial Meltdown. Part I: From Shadow Financial System
to Shadow Bailout,” International Journal of Political Economy
38, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 3–34; and “Too Big to Bail: The
‘Paulson Put,’ Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial
Meltdown. Part II: Fatal Reversal—Single Payer and Back,”
International Journal of Political Economy38, no. 2 (Summer
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